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Amira and Benito are experts in the epidemiology of influenza. Their expertise, therefore,
covers a claim that interests us, namely, that the next ‘flu pandemic will occur in 2019. Call
that proposition X and its negation X. Here are Amira’s and Benito’s credences or degrees
of belief in that pair of propositions:1
X X
Amira 0.5 0.1
Benito 0.2 0.6
We would like to arrive at a single coherent pair of credences in X and X. Perhaps we wish
to use these to set our own credences; or perhaps we wish to publish them in a report of the
WHO as the collective view of expert epidemiologists; or perhaps we wish to use them in
a decision-making process to determine how medical research funding should be allocated
in 2018. Given their expertise, we would like to use Amira’s and Benito’s credences when
we are coming up with ours. However, there are two problems. First, Amira and Benito
disagree— they assign different credences to X and different credences to X. Second, Amira
and Benito are incoherent — they each assign credences to X and X that do not sum to
1. How, then, are we to proceed? There are natural ways to aggregate different credence
functions; and there are natural ways to fix incoherent credence functions. Thus, we might
fixAmira and Benito first and then aggregate the fixes; orwemight aggregate their credences
first and then fix up the aggregate. But what if these two disagree, as we will see they are
sometimes wont to do? Which should we choose? To complicate matters further, there is a
natural way to do both at once — it makes credences coherent and aggregates them all at
the same time. What if this one-step procedure disagrees with one or other or both of the
two-step procedures, fix-then-aggregate and aggregate-then-fix? In what follows, I explore
∗I would like to thank Liam Kofi Bright, Remco Heesen, Ben Levinstein, Julia Staffel, Greg Wheeler, and two
referees for Synthese for helpful discussions that improved this paper.
1An agent’s credence in a proposition is her degree of belief in it. That is, it measures how confident she is in
the proposition. Sometimes these are called her subjective probabilities or forecasts of probabilities. I avoid the latter
terminology since it might suggest to the reader that these credences are probabilistically coherent, and we are
interested in this paper in cases in which they are not. As I write them, credences are real numbers in the unit
interval [0, 1]. Others write them as percentages. Thus, where I write that Amira has credence 0.5 in X, others
might write that she has credence 50% in X or that she is 50% confident in X. Translating between the two is
obviously straightforward.
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when such disagreement arises and what the conditions are that guarantee that they will
not. Then I will explain how these results may be used in philosophical arguments. I begin,
however, with an overview of the paper.
We begin, in section 1, by presenting the two most popular methods for aggregating
credences: linear pooling (LP) takes the aggregate of a set of credence functions to be their
weighted arithmetic average, while geometric pooling (GP) takes their weighted geometric
average and then normalises that. Then, in section 2 we describe a natural method for fixing
incoherent credences: specify a measure of how far one credence function lies from the other,
and fix an incoherent credence function by taking the coherent function that is closest to it
according to that measure. We focus particularly on two of the most popular such measures:
squared Euclidean distance (SED) and generalized Kullback-Leibler divergence (GKL). In section
3, we begin to see how the methods for fixing interact with the methods for aggregating: if
we pair our measures of distance with our pooling methods carefully, they commute; other-
wise, they do not. And we begin to see the central theme of the paper emerging: LP pairs
naturally with SED, while GP pairs with GKL. In section 4, we note that, just as we can
fix incoherent credence functions by minimizing distance from or to coherence, so we can
aggregate credence functions by taking the aggregate to be the credence function that min-
imizes the weighted average distance from or to those credence functions. The aggregation
methods that result don’t necessarily result in coherent credence functions, however. To
rectify this, in section 5 we introduce the Weighted Coherent Aggregation Principle, which
takes the aggregate to be the coherent credence function that minimizes the weighted average
distance from or to the credence functions to be aggregated. Up to this point, we have been
talking generally about measures of the distance from one credence function to another,
or only about or two favoured examples. In section 6, we introduce the class of additive
Bregman divergences, which is the focus for the remainder of the paper. Our two favoured
measures, SED and GKL, belong to this class, as do many more besides. In section 7 we
come to the central results of the paper. They vindicate the earlier impression that linear
pooling matches with squared Euclidean distance, while geometric pooling matches with
generalized Kullback-Leibler divergence. Theorems 10 and 13 shows that the only methods
of fixing or fixing-and-aggregating-together that commute with LP are those based on SED,
while the only methods that commute with GP are those based on GKL. And Theorems 11,
12, and 14 describe the ways in which aggregating and fixing interact when we define both
by minimizing distance. Finally, by section 8, we have all of our results in place and we can
turn to their philosophical significance. I argue that these results can be used as philosophi-
cal booster rockets: on their own, they support no philosophical conclusion; but paired with
an existing argument, either in favour of a way of aggregating or in favour of a particular
measure of distance between credence functions, they can extend the conclusion of those
arguments significantly. They say what measure of distance you should use if you wish to
aggregate by LP or by GP, for instance; and they say what aggregation method you should
use if you favour SED or GKL over other measures of distance. In section 9, we ask what
happens when we lift a certain restriction that we have imposed throughout the earlier sec-
tions of the paper. And in section 10, we conclude. The Appendix provides proofs for all of
the results.
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1 Aggregating credences
Let’s begin by considering two different methods for aggregating a collection of credence
functions that are defined over the same set of propositions F = {X1, . . . ,Xm}. For the
majority of the paper, we restrict attention to the case in which F = {X1, . . . ,Xm} forms a
partition.2 Then, in section 9, we lift the restriction and see what happens.
Let CF be the set of credence functions over F . And let PF ⊆ CF be the set of coherent
credence functions over F .3 Throughout, we take an agent’s credence function to record
her true credences. It doesn’t record her reports of her credences, and it doesn’t record the
outcome of some particular method of measuring those credences. It records the credences
themselves. Thus, we focus on cases in which our agent is genuinely incoherent, and not on
cases in which they appear incoherent because of some flaw in ourmethods ofmeasurement.
An aggregation method is a function T : (CF )n → CF that takes n credence functions
— the agents — and returns a single credence function — the aggregate. Both aggregation
methodswe consider in this section appeal to a set of weights α1, . . . , αn for the agents, which
we denote {α}. We assume α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0 and ∑nk=1 αk = 1.
First, linear pooling. This says that we obtain the aggregate credence for a particular
proposition Xj in F by taking a weighted arithmetic average of the agents’ credences in
Xj; and we use the same weights for each proposition. The weighted arithmetic average of
a sequence of numbers b1, . . . , bn given weights α1, . . . , αn is ∑
n
k=1 αkbk = α1b1 + . . . + αnbn.
Thus:
Linear Pooling (LP) Let {α} be a set of weights. Then
LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn)(Xj) = α1c1(Xj) + . . .+ αncn(Xj) =
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
for each Xj in F .
Thus, to aggregate Amira’s and Benito’s credences in this way, we first pick a weight 0 ≤
α ≤ 1. Then the aggregate credence in X is 0.5α + 0.2(1− α), while the aggregate credence
in X is 0.1α + 0.6(1 − α). Thus, if α = 0.4, the aggregate credence in X is 0.32, while the
aggregate credence in X is 0.4. (See Figure 1 for an illustration of the effect of linear pooling
on Amira’s and Benito’s credences.) Notice that, just as the two agents are incoherent, so is
the aggregate. This is typically the case, though not universally, when we use linear pooling.
Second, we consider geometric pooling. This uses weighted geometric averages where lin-
ear pooling usesweighted arithmetic averages. Theweighted geometric average is ∏ni=1 b
αi
i =
bα11 × . . . × bαnn . Now, when all of the agents’ credence functions are coherent, so is the cre-
dence function that results from taking weighted arithmetic averages of the credences they
assign. That is, if ck(X1) + . . .+ ck(Xm) = 1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, then
n
∑
k=1
αkck(X1) + . . .+
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xm) = 1
However, the same is not true of weighted geometric averaging. Even if ck(X1) + . . . +
2That is, X1 ∨ . . . ∨ Xm ≡ ⊤ and XiXj ≡ ⊥, for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m.
3Since X1, . . . ,Xm is a partition, PF = {c ∈ CF : c(X1) + . . .+ c(Xm) = 1}.
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ck(Xm) = 1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, there is no guarantee that
n
∏
k=1
ck(X1)
αk + . . .+
n
∏
k=1
ck(Xm)
αk = 1
Thus, in geometric pooling, after taking the weighed geometric average, we need to normal-
ize. So, for each cell Xj of our partition, we first take the weighted geometric average of the
agents’ credences ck(Xj), and then we normalize the results. So the aggregated credence for
Xj is
∏
n
k=1 ck(Xj)
αk
∏
n
k=1 ck(X1)
αk + . . .+ ∏nk=1 ck(Xm)
αk
=
∏
n
k=1 ck(Xj)
αk
∑
m
i=1 ∏
n
k=1 ck(Xi)
αk
That is,
Geometric Pooling (GP) Let {α} be a set of weights. Then
GP{α}(c1, . . . , cn)(Xj) =
∏
n
k=1 ck(Xj)
αk
∑
m
i=1 ∏
n
k=1 ck(Xi)
αk
for each Xj in F .
Thus, to aggregate Amira’s and Benito’s credences in this way, we first pick a weight α.
Then the aggregate credence in X is 0.5
α0.21−α
0.5α0.21−α+0.1α0.61−α , while the aggregate credence in X is
0.1α+0.61−α
0.5α0.21−α+0.1α0.61−α . Thus, if α = 0.4, the aggregate credence in X is 0.496, while the aggregate
credence in X is 0.504. (Again, see Figure 2 for an illustration.) Note that, this time, the
aggregate is guaranteed to be coherent, even though the agents are incoherent.
2 Fixing incoherent credences
Amira has incoherent credences. How are we to fix her up so that she is coherent? And
Benito? In general, how do we fix up an incoherent credence function so that it is coherent?
A natural thought is that we should pick the credence function that is as similar as possible
to the incoherent credence function whilst being coherent — we might think of this as a
method of minimal mutilation.4
For this purpose, we need a measure of distance between credence functions. In fact,
since the measures we will use do not have the properties that mathematicians usually re-
quire of distances — they aren’t typically metrics—we will follow the statisticians in calling
them divergences instead. A divergence is a function D : CF × CF → [0,∞] such that (i)
D(c, c) = 0 for all c, and (ii) D(c, c′) > 0 for all c 6= c′. We do not require that D is sym-
metric: that is, we do not assume D(c, c′) = D(c′, c) for all c, c′. Nor do we require that D
satisfies the triangle inequality: that is, we do not assume D(c, c′′) ≤ D(c, c′) +D(c′, c′′) for
all c, c′, c′′. Now, suppose D is a divergence. Then the suggestion is this: given a credence
function c, we fix it by taking the coherent credence function c∗ such thatD(c∗, c) is minimal;
or perhaps the coherent credence function c∗ such that D(c, c∗) is minimal — since D may
not be symmetric, these two ways of fixing cmight give different results. Thus:5
4Such a fixing procedure is at least suggested by the second central result of (De Bona & Staffel, 2017, 204).
We will meet the principle of minimal mutilation again in section 8.
5Recall: PF is the set of coherent credence functions over F .
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Fixing Given a credence function c, let
FixD1(c) = argmin
c′∈PF
D(c′, c)
and
FixD2(c) = argmin
c′∈PF
D(c, c′)
Throughout this paper, we will be concerned particularly with fixing incoherent credence
functions using the so-called additive Bregman divergences (Bregman, 1967). I’ll introduce
these properly in section 6, but let’s meet two of the most famous Bregman divergences
now:
Squared Euclidean Distance (SED)
SED(c, c′) = ∑
X∈F
(c(X)− c′(X))2
This is the divergence used in the least squares method in data fitting, where we wish to
measure how far a putative fit to the data, c, lies from the data itself c′. For arguments
in its favour, see (Selten, 1998; Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010a; D’Agostino & Sinigaglia, 2010;
Pettigrew, 2016).
Generalized Kullback-Leibler (GKL)
GKL(c, c′) = ∑
X∈F
(
c(X) log
c(X)
c′(X)
− c(X) + c′(X)
)
This is most famously used in information theory to measure the information gained by
moving from a prior distribution, c′, to a posterior, c. For arguments in its favour, see
(Paris & Vencovska´, 1990, 1997; Levinstein, 2012a).
Let’s see the effect of these on Amira’s and Benito’s credences. First, let’s use SED. SED
is symmetric — that is, SED(c, c′) = SED(c′, c), for all c, c′.6 Therefore, both fixing meth-
ods agree — that is, FixSED1 = FixSED2 . GKL isn’t symmetric. However, its fixing methods
nonetheless always agree for credences defined on a partition— that is, as we will see below,
we also have FixGKL1 = FixGKL2 .
X X
Amira (original) 0.5 0.1
Benito (original) 0.2 0.6
Amira (SED-fixed) 0.7 0.3
Benito (SED-fixed) 0.3 0.7
Amira (GKL-fixed) 0.83 0.17
Benito (GKL-fixed) 0.25 0.75
In general:
Proposition 1 For all c in CF and Xj in F ,
6Indeed, SED is the only symmetric Bregman divergence.
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(i) FixSED1(c)(Xj) = FixSED2(c)(Xj) = c(Xj) +
1−∑mi=1 c(Xi)
m
(ii) FixGKL1(c)(Xj) = FixGKL2(c)(Xj) =
c(Xj)
∑
m
i=1 c(Xi)
In other words, when we use SED to fix an incoherent credence function c over a parti-
tion X1, . . . ,Xm, we add the same quantity to each credence. That is, there is K such that
FixSED(c)(Xj) = c(Xj) + K, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Thus, the difference between a fixed cre-
dence and the original credence is always the same — it is K. In order to ensure that the
result is coherent, this quantity must be K =
1−∑mi=1 c(Xi)
m . On the other hand, when we use
GKL to fix c, we multiply each credence by the same quantity. That is, there is K such that
FixGKL(c)(Xj) = K · c(Xj), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Thus, the ratio between a fixed credence and the
original credence is always the same — it is K. In order to ensure that the result is coherent
in this case, this quantity must be K = 1
∑
m
i=1 c(Xi)
.
There is also a geometric way to understand the relationship between fixing using SED
and fixing using GKL. Roughly: FixSED(c) is the orthogonal projection of c onto the set
of coherent credence functions, while FixGKL(c) is the result of projecting from the origin
through c onto the set of coherent credence functions. This is illustrated in Figures 1 and
2. One consequence is this: if c(X) + c(X) < 1, then fixing using SED is more conservative
than fixing by GKL, in the sense that the resulting credence function is less opinionated —
it has a lower maximum credence. But if c(X) + c(X) > 1, then fixing using GKL is more
conservative.
3 Aggregate-then-fix vs fix-then-aggregate
Using the formulae in Proposition 1, we can explore what differences, if any, there are be-
tween fixing incoherent agents and then aggregating them, on the one hand, and aggregat-
ing incoherent agents and then fixing the aggregate, on the other. Suppose c1, . . . , cn are
the credence functions of a group of agents, all defined on the same partition X1, . . . ,Xm.
Some may be incoherent, and we wish to aggregate them. Thus, we might first fix each cre-
dence function, and then aggregate the resulting coherent credence functions; or we might
aggregate the original credence functions, and then fix the resulting aggregate. When we
aggregate, we have two methods at our disposal — linear pooling (LP) and geometric pool-
ing (GP); and when we fix, we have two methods at our disposal — one based on squared
Euclidean distance (SED) and the other based on generalized Kullback-Leibler divergence
(GKL). Our next result tells us how these different options interact. To state it, we borrow a
little notation from the theory of function composition. For instance, we write LP{α} ◦ FixSED
to denote the function that takes a collection of agents’ credence functions c1, . . . , cn and
returns LP{α}(FixSED(c1), . . . , FixSED(cn)). So LP{α} ◦ FixSED might be read: LP{α} following
FixSED, or LP
{α} acting on the results of FixSED. Similarly, FixSED ◦ LP{α} denotes the function
that takes c1, . . . , cn and returns FixSED(LP
{α}(c1, . . . , cn)). And we say that two functions are
equal if they agree on all arguments, and unequal if they disagree on some.
Proposition 2
(i) LP{α} ◦ FixSED = FixSED ◦ LP{α}.
That is, linear pooling commutes with SED-fixing.
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That is, for all c1, . . . cn,
LP{α}(FixSED(c1), . . . , FixSED(cn)) = FixSED(LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn))
And the resulting credence function assigns the following credence to Xj:
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj) +
1−∑mi=1 ∑nk=1 αkck(Xi)
m
(ii) LP{α} ◦ FixGKL 6= FixGKL ◦ LP{α}.
That is, linear pooling does not commute with GKL-fixing.
That is, for some c1, . . . , cn,
LP{α}(FixGKL(c1), . . . , FixGKL(cn)) 6= FixGKL(LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn))
(iii) GP{α} ◦ FixGKL = FixGKL ◦GP{α}.
That is, geometric pooling commutes with GKL-fixing.
That is, for all c1, . . . , cn,
GP{α}(FixGKL(c1), . . . , FixGKL(cn)) = FixGKL(GP{α}(c1, . . . , cn))
And the resulting credence function assigns the following credence to Xj:
∏
n
k=1 ck(Xj)
αk
∑
m
i=1 ∏
n
k=1 ck(Xi)
αk
(iv) GP{α} ◦ FixSED 6= FixSED ◦GP{α}.
That is, geometric pooling does not commute with SED-fixing.
That is, for some c1, . . . , cn,
GP{α}(FixSED(c1), . . . , FixSED(cn)) 6= FixSED(GP{α}(c1, . . . , cn))
With this result, we start to see the main theme of this paper emerging: SED naturally ac-
companies linear pooling, while GKL naturally accompanies geometric pooling. In section
7, we’ll present further results that support that conclusion, as well as some that complicate
it a little.
4 Aggregating by minimizing distance
In the previous section, we introduced the notion of a divergence and we put it to use fixing
incoherent credence functions: given an incoherent credence function c, we fix it by taking
the coherent credence function that minimizes divergence to or from c. But divergences can
also be used to aggregate credence functions.7 The idea is this: given a divergence and a col-
lection of credence functions, take the aggregate to be the credence function that minimizes
theweighted arithmetic average of the divergences to or from those credence functions. Thus:
7When the agents are represented as having categorical doxastic states, such as full beliefs or commitments,
this method was studied first in the computer science literature on belief merging (Konieczny & Pino-Pe´rez, 1999;
Konieczny & Gre´goire, 2006). It was studied first in the judgment aggregation literature by Gabriella Pigozzi
(2006).
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D-aggregation Let {α} be a set of weights. Then
Agg
{α}
D1
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈CF
n
∑
k=1
αkD(c
′, ck)
and
Agg
{α}
D2
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈CF
n
∑
k=1
αkD(ck, c
′)
Let’s see what these give when applied to the two divergenceswe introduced above, namely,
SED and GKL.
Proposition 3 Let {α} be a set of weights. Then, for each Xj in F ,
(i)
Agg
{α}
SED(c1, . . . , cn)(Xj) =
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj) = LP
{α}(c1, . . . , cn)
(ii)
Agg
{α}
GKL1
(c1, . . . , cn)(Xj) =
n
∏
k=1
ck(Xj)
αk = GP
{α}
− (c1, . . . , cn)
(ii)
Agg
{α}
GKL2
(c1, . . . , cn)(Xj) =
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj) = LP
{α}(c1, . . . , cn)
Thus, AggSED and AggGKL2 are just linear pooling — they assign to each Xj the (unnormal-
ized) weighted arithmetic average of the credences assigned to Xj by the agents. On the
other hand, AggGKL1 is just geometric pooling without the normalization procedure — it as-
signs to each Xj the (unnormalized) weighted geometic average of the credences assigned
to Xj by the agents. I call this aggregation procedure GP−. Given a set of coherent credence
functions, GP returns a coherent credence function, but GP− typically won’t. However, if
we aggregate using GP− and then fix using GKL, then we obtain GP:
Proposition 4 Let {α} be a set of weights. Then
GP{α} = FixGKL ◦GP{α}−
5 Aggregate and fix together
In this section, we meet our final procedure for producing a single coherent credence func-
tion from a collection of possibly incoherent ones. This procedure fixes and aggregates to-
gether: that is, it is a one-step process, unlike the two-step processes we have considered so
far. It generalises a technique suggested by Osherson & Vardi (2006) and explored further by
Predd et al. (2008).8 Again, it appeals to a divergence D; and thus again, there are two ver-
sions, depending on whether we measure distance from coherence or distance to coherence.
8Osherson & Vardi (2006) and Predd et al. (2008) consider only what we call WCAP
{ 1n }
SED1
below. They do not
consider the different Bregman divergencesD; they do not consider the two directions; and they do not consider
the possibility of weighting the distances differently. This is quite understandable — their interest lies mainly in
the feasibility of the procedure from a computational point of view. We will not address this issue here.
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If wemeasure distance from coherence, theweighted coherent approximation principle tells us to
pick the coherent credence function such that the weighted arithmetic average of the diver-
gences from that coherent credence function to the agents is minimized. And if we measure
distance to coherence, it picks the coherent credence function that minimizes the weighted
arithmetic average of the divergences from the agents to the credence function. Thus, it
poses a minimization problem similar to that posed by D-aggregation, but in this case, we
wish to find the credence function amongst the coherent ones that does the minimizing; in the
case ofD-aggregation, we wish to find the credence function amongst all the credence ones that
does the minimizing.
Weighted Coherent Approximation Principle Let {α} be a set of weights. Then
WCAP
{α}
D1
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈PF
n
∑
k=1
αkD(c
′, ck)
and
WCAP
{α}
D2
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈PF
n
∑
k=1
αkD(ck, c
′)
How does this procedure compare to the fix-then-aggregate and aggregate-then-fix proce-
dures that we considered above? Our next result gives the answer:
Proposition 5 Let {α} be a set of weights. Then
(i)
WCAP
{α}
SED = LP
{α} ◦ FixSED = FixSED ◦ LP{α}
= Agg
{α}
SED ◦ FixSED = FixSED ◦Agg{α}SED
(ii)
WCAP
{α}
GKL1
= GP{α} ◦ FixGKL = FixGKL ◦GP{α}
= Agg
{α}
GKL1
◦ FixGKL = FixGKL ◦Agg{α}GKL1
= GP{α}
(iii)
WCAP
{α}
GKL2
6= GP{α} ◦ FixGKL = FixGKL ◦GP{α}
= GP{α}
In this case,
WCAP
{α}
GKL2
(c1, . . . , cn)(Xj) =
∑
n
k=1 αkck(Xj)
∑
n
k=1 αkck(X1) + . . .+ ∑
n
k=1 αkck(Xn)
=
∑
n
k=1 αkck(Xj)
∑
m
i=1 ∑
n
k=1 αkck(Xi)
Thus, it first takes a linear pool of the credences and then normalizes.
(iv)
WCAP
{α}
GKL2
= FixGKL ◦Agg{α}GKL2 6= Agg
{α}
GKL2
◦ FixGKL
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(i) and (ii) confirm our picture that linear pooling naturally pairs with SED, while geometric
pooling pairs naturally with GKL. However, (iii) and (iv) complicate this. This is a pattern
we will continue to see as we progress: when we miminize distance from coherence, the
aggregation methods and divergence measures pair up neatly; when we minimize distance
to coherence, they do not.
These, then, are the various ways we will consider by which you might produce a single
coherent credence function when given a collection of possibly incoherent ones: fix-then-
aggregate, aggregate-then-fix, and the weighted coherent approximation principle. Each
involves minimizing a divergence at some point, and so each comes in two varieties, one
based on minimizing distance from coherence, the other based on minimizing distance to
coherence.
Are these the only possible ways? There is one other that might seem a natural cousin
of WCAP, and one that might seem a natural cousin of D-aggregation, which we might
combine with fixing in either of the ways considered above. In WCAP, we pick the coherent
credence function that minimizes the weighted arithmetic average of the distances from (or
to) the agents. The use of the weighted arithmetic average here might lead you to expect
that WCAP will pair most naturally with linear pooling, which aggregates by taking the
weighted arithmetic average of the agents’ credences. You might expect it to interact poorly
with geometric pooling, which aggregates by taking the weighted geometric average of the
agents’ credences (and then normalizing). But, in fact, as we saw in Theorem 5(ii), when
coupled with the divergence GKL, and when we minimize distance from coherence, rather
than distance to coherence, WCAP entails geometric pooling. Nonetheless, we might think
that if it is natural to minimize the weighted arithmetic average of distances from coherence,
and if both linear and geometric pooling are on the table, revealing that we have no prejudice
against using geometric averages to aggregate numerical values, then it is equally natural to
minimize the weighted geometric average of distances from coherence. This gives:
Weighted Geometric Coherent Approximation Principle Let {α} be a set of
weights. Then
WGCAP
{α}
D1
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈PF
n
∏
k=1
D(c′, ck)αk
and
WGCAP
{α}
D2
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈PF
n
∏
k=1
D(ck, c
′)αk
However, it is easy to see that:
Proposition 6 For any divergence D, any set of weights {α}, any i ∈ {1, 2}, and any coherent
credence functions c1, . . . , cn,
c∗ = WGCAP{α}
Di
(c1, . . . , cn) iff c
∗ = c1 or . . . or cn
That is, WGCAP gives a dictatorship rule when applied to coherent agents: it aggregates a
group of agents by picking one of those agents and making her stand for the whole group.
This rules it out immediately as a method of aggregation.
Similarly, we might define a geometric cousin toD-aggregation:
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vXX
X
vX
cA
cB
FixSED(cA)
FixSED(cB)
LP{0.4,0.6}(FixSED(cA), FixSED(cB))
= FixSED(LP
{0.4,0.6}(cA, cB))
LP{0.4,0.6}(cA, cB)
Figure 1: Linear pooling and SED-fixing applied to Amira’s and Benito’s credences. If F = {X,X},
we can represent the set of all credence functions defined on X and X as the points in the unit
square: we represent c : {X,X} → [0, 1] as the point (c(X), c(X)), so that the x-coordinate
gives the credence in X, while the y-coordinate gives the credence in X. In this way, we
represent Amira’s credence function as cA and Benito’s as cB in the diagram above. And
PF , the set of coherent credence functions, is represented by the thick diagonal line joining
the omniscient credence functions vX and vX . As we can see, FixSED(cA) is the orthogonal
projection of cA onto this set of coherent credence functions; and similarly for FixSED(cB) and
FixSED(LP
{0.4,0.6}(cA, cB)). The straight line from cA to cB represents the set of linear pools of
cA and cB generated by different weightings. The arrows indicated that you can reach the
same point — LP{0.4,0.6}(FixSED(cA), FixSED(cB)) = FixSED(LP{0.4,0.6}(cA, cB)) — from either
direction. That is, LP and FixSED commute.
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vXX
X
vX
cA
cB
GP{0.4,0.6}(FixGKL(cA), FixGKL(cB))
= FixGKL(GP
{0.4,0.6}
− (cA, cB))
FixGKL(cA)
FixGKL(cB)
GP
{0.4,0.6}
− (cA, cB)
Figure 2: Here, we see that FixGKL(cA) is the projection from the origin through
cA onto the set of coherent credence functions; and similarly for FixGKL(cB) and
FixGKL(GP
{0.4,0.6}
− (cA, cB)). The curved line from cA to cB represents the set of geomet-
ric pools of cA and cB generated by different weightings. Again, the arrows indicate that
GP = FixGKL ◦GP− = GP ◦ FixGKL.
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Geometric D-aggregation Let {α} be a set of weights. Then
GAgg
{α}
D1
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈CF
n
∏
k=1
D(c′, ck)αk
and
GAgg
{α}
D2
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈CF
n
∏
k=1
D(ck, c
′)αk
However, we obtain a similar result to before, though this time the dictatorship arises for
any set of agents, not just coherent ones.
Proposition 7 For any divergence D, any set of weights {α}, any i ∈ {1, 2}, and any credence
functions c1, . . . , cn,
c∗ = GAgg{α}
Di
(c1, . . . , cn) iff c
∗ = c1 or . . . or cn
Thus, in what follows, we will consider only fix-then-aggregate, aggregate-then-fix, and
WCAP.
6 Bregman divergences
In the previous section, we stated our definition of fixing and our definition of the weighted
coherent approximation principle in terms of a divergence D. We then identified two such
divergences, SED and GKL, and we explored how those ways of making incoherent cre-
dences coherent related to ways of combining different credence functions to give a single
one. This leaves us with two further questions: Which other divergences might we use
when we are fixing incoherent credences? And how do the resulting ways of fixing relate
to our aggregation principles? In this section, we introduce a large family of divergences
known as the additive Bregman divergences (Bregman, 1967). SED and GKL are both addi-
tive Bregman divergences, and indeed Bregman introduced the notion as a generalisation
of SED. They are widely used in statistics to measure how far one probability distribution
lies from another (Csisza´r, 1991; Banerjee et al., 2005; Gneiting & Raftery, 2007; Csisza´r, 2008;
Predd et al., 2009); they are used in social choice theory to measure how far one distribution
of wealth lies from another (D’Agostino & Dardanoni, 2009; Magdalou & Nock, 2011); and
they are used in the epistemology of credences to define measures of the inaccuracy of cre-
dence functions (Pettigrew, 2016). Below, I will offer some reasons why we should use them
in our procedures for fixing incoherent credences. But first let’s define them.
Each additive Bregman divergence D : CF × CF → [0,∞] is generated by a function
ϕ : [0, 1] → R, which is required to be (i) strictly convex on [0, 1] and (ii) twice differentiable
on (0, 1) with a continuous second derivative. We begin by using ϕ to define the divergence
from x to y, where 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1. We first draw the tangent to ϕ at y. Then we take the
divergence from x to y to be the difference between the value of ϕ at x— that is, ϕ(x)— and
the value of that tangent at x — that is, ϕ(y) + ϕ′(y)(x − y). Thus, the divergence from x
to y is ϕ(x)− ϕ(y)− ϕ′(y)(x− y). We then take the divergence from one credence function
c to another c′ to be the sum of the divergences from each credence assigned by c to the
corresponding credence assigned by c′. Thus:
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Definition 1 Suppose ϕ : [0, 1] → R is a strictly convex function that is twice differentiable on
(0, 1) with a continuous second derivative. And suppose D : CF × CF → [0,∞]. Then D is the
additive Bregman divergence generated by ϕ if, for any c, c′ in CF ,
D(c, c′) =
m
∑
i=1
ϕ(c(Xi))− ϕ(c′(Xi))− ϕ′(c′(Xi))(c(Xi)− c′(Xi))
And we can show:
Proposition 8
(i) SED is the additive Bregman divergence generated by ϕ(x) = x2.
(ii) GKL is the additive Bregman divergence generated by ϕ(x) = x log x− x.
Why dowe restrict our attention to additive Bregman divergenceswhenwe are consider-
ing which divergences to use to fix incoherent credences? Here’s one answer.9 Just as beliefs
can be true or false, credences can be more or less accurate. A credence in a true proposition
is more accurate the higher it is, while a credence in a false proposition is more accurate
the lower it is. Now, just as some philosophers think that beliefs are more valuable if they
are true than if they are false (Goldman, 2002), so some philosophers think that credences
are more valuable the more accurate they are (Joyce, 1998; Pettigrew, 2016). This approach
is sometimes called accuracy-first epistemology. These philosophers then provide mathemati-
cally precise ways to measure the inaccuracy of credence functions. They say that a credence
function c is more inaccurate at a possible world w the further c lies from the omniscient
credence function vw at w, where vw assigns maximal credence (i.e. 1) to all truths at w and
minimal credence (i.e. 0) to all falsehoods at w. So, in order to measure the inaccuracy of c
at w we need a measure of how far one credence function lies from another, just as we do
when we want to fix incoherent credence functions. But which divergences are legitimate
measures for this purpose? Elsewhere, I have argued that it is only the additive Bregman
divergences (Pettigrew, 2016, Chapter 4).10 I won’t rehearse the argument here, but I will
accept the conclusion.
Now, on its own, my argument that only the additive Bregman divergences are legiti-
mate for the purpose of measuring inaccuracy does not entail that only the additive Breg-
man divergences are legitimate for the purpose of correcting incoherent credences. But the
following argument gives us reason to take that further step as well. One of the appealing
features of the so-called accuracy-first approach to the epistemology of credences is that it
gives a neat and compelling argument for the credal norm of probabilism, which says that an
agent should have a coherent credence function (Joyce, 1998; Pettigrew, 2016). Having justi-
fied the restriction to the additive Bregman divergences on other grounds, the accuracy-first
argument for probabilism is based on the following mathematical fact:
Theorem 9 ((Predd et al., 2009)) SupposeD is an additive Bregman divergence. And suppose c is
an incoherent credence function. Then, if c∗ = argmin
c′∈PF
D(c′, c), then D(vi, c∗) < D(vi, c) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ m, where vi(Xj) = 1 if i = j and vi(Xj) = 0 if i 6= j.
9See (De Bona & Staffel, 2017) for a similar line of argument.
10If we use Bregman divergences to measure the distance from the omniscient credence function to another
credence function, the resulting measure of inaccuracy is a strictly proper scoring rule. These measures of inaccu-
racy have been justified independently in the accuracy-first literature (Oddie, 1997; Gibbard, 2008; Joyce, 2009).
And conversely, given a strictly proper scoring rule, we can easily recover an additive Bregman divergence.
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That is, if c is incoherent, then the closest coherent credence function to c is closer to all
the possible omniscient credence functions than c is, and thus is more accurate than c is at
all possible worlds. Thus, if we fix up incoherent credence functions by using an additive
Bregman divergence and taking the nearest coherent credence function, then we have an
explanation for why we fix up incoherent credence functions in this way, namely, that doing
so is guaranteed to increase the accuracy of the credence function. To see this in action,
consider FixSED(cA) and FixSED(cB) in Figure 1. It is clear from this picture that FixSED(cA) is
closer to vX than cA is, and closer to vX than cA is.
7 The main results
7.1 Minimizing distance from coherence
From Proposition 5(i) and (ii), we learned of an additive Bregman divergence that fixes up
incoherent credences in a way that cooperates with linear pooling — it is SED. And we
learned of an additive Bregman divergence that fixes up incoherent credences in a way that
cooperates with geometric pooling, at least when you fix by minimizing distance from coher-
ence rather than distance to coherence — it is GKL. But this leaves open whether there are
other additive Bregman divergences that cooperate with either of these rules. The following
theorem shows that there are not.
Theorem 10 Suppose D is an additive Bregman divergence. Then:
(i) WCAPD1 = FixD1 ◦ LP iff D is a positive linear transformation of SED.
(ii) WCAPD1 = FixD1 ◦GP = GP ◦ FixD1 iff D is a positive linear transformation of GKL.
Thus, suppose you fix incoherent credences by minimizing distance from coherence. And
suppose you wish to fix and aggregate in ways that cooperate with one another — we will
consider an argument for doing this in section 8. Then, if you measure the divergence be-
tween credence functions using SED, then Proposition 5 says you should aggregate by linear
pooling. If, on the other hand, you wish to use GKL, then you should aggregate by geomet-
ric pooling. And, conversely, if you aggregate credences by linear pooling, then Theorem 10
says you should fix incoherent credences using SED. If, on the other hand, you aggregate
by geometric pooling, then you should fix incoherent credences using GKL. In section 8,
we will ask whether we have reason to fix and aggregate in ways that cooperate with one
another.
We learned something further from Proposition 5(i) and (ii). We learned that SED-aggregation
commutes with SED-fixing, and their combination agrees with WCAPSED; and we learned
that GKL1-aggregation commuteswith GKL1-fixing, and their combination agreeswithWCAPGKL1 .
The following result shows that this pattern generalises: D1-aggregation commutes withD1-
fixing, and their combination agrees withWCAPD1 , for any additive Bregman divergenceD.
Theorem 11 Suppose D is an additive Bregman divergence. Then
WCAPD1 = FixD1 ◦AggD1 = AggD1 ◦ FixD1
This is a useful result if you are already in possession of an additive Bregman divergence
and you wish to find an aggregation method that will cooperate with it.
We round off this section with a result that is unsurprising in the light of previous results:
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Theorem 12 Suppose D is an additive Bregman divergence. Then,
(i) Agg
D1
= LP iff D is a positive linear transformation of SED.
(ii) Agg
D1
= GP− iff D is a positive linear transformation of GKL.
7.2 Minimizing distance to coherence
Next, let us consider what happens when we fix incoherent credences by minimizing dis-
tance to coherence rather than distance from coherence.
Theorem 13 Suppose D is an additive Bregman divergence. Then,
(i) WCAPD2 = FixD2 ◦ LP.
(ii) WCAPD2 = FixD2 ◦ LP = LP ◦ FixD2 , when the methods are applied to coherent cre-
dences.
(iii) WCAPD2 = FixD2 ◦ LP = LP ◦ FixD2 iff D is a positive linear transformation of SED.
Theorem 13(iii) gives the analogue to Theorem 10(i). Only SED cooperates with linear pool-
ing, even when we fix by minimizing distance to coherence. On the other hand, Theo-
rem 13(i) and (ii) entail that there is no analogue to Theorem 10(ii). There is no addi-
tive Bregman divergence that cooperates with geometric pooling when we fix by minimiz-
ing distance to coherence. That is, there is no additive Bregman divergence D such that
WCAPD2 = FixD2 ◦ GP = GP ◦ FixD2 . This result complicates our thesis from above that
SED pairs naturally with linear pooling while GKL pairs naturally with geometric pooling.
We round off this section with the analogue of Theorem 12:
Theorem 14 Suppose D is an additive Bregman divergence. Then, Agg
D2
= LP.
8 The philosophical significance of the results
What is the philosophical upshot of the results that we have presented so far? I think they
are best viewed as supplements that can be added to existing arguments. On their own,
they do not support any particular philosophical conclusion. But, combined with an exist-
ing philosophical argument, they extend its conclusion significantly. They are, if you like,
philosophical booster rockets.
There are twoways in which the results above might provide such argumentative boosts.
First, if you think that the aggregate of a collection of credence functions should be the cre-
dence function that minimizes the weighted average divergence from or to those functions,
then you might appeal to Proposition 3 or Theorems 12 and 14 either to move from a way of
measuring divergence to a method of aggregation, or to move from an aggregation method
to a favoured divergence. Thus, given an argument for linear pooling, and an argument that
you should aggregate by minimizing weighted average distance from the aggregate to the
agent, you might cite Theorem 12(i) and argue for measuring how far one credence func-
tion lies from another using SED. Or, given an argument that aggregation is minimizing
weighted average divergence to the agents, and an argument in favour of GKL, you might
cite Theorem 12(ii) and conclude further that you should aggregate by GP−. Throw in an
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argument that you should fix incoherent credence functions by minimizing distance from
coherence and this gives an argument for GP.
Second, if you think that the three possible ways of producing a single coherent credence
function from a collection of possibly incoherent ones should cooperate — that is, if you
think that aggregate-then-fix, fix-then-aggregate, and the weighted coherent approximation
principle should all give the same outputs when supplied with the same input — then you
might appeal to Theorems 10 and 13 to move from aggregation method to divergence, or
vice versa. For instance, if you think we should fix by minimizing distance from coherence,
you might use Theorem 10(i) to boost an argument for linear pooling so that it becomes also
an argument for SED, or to boost an argument for geometric pooling to give an argument
for GKL. And so on.
We begin, in this section, by looking at the bases for these two sorts of argument. Then
we consider the sorts of philosophical argument to which our boosts might be applied. That
is, we ask what sorts of arguments we might give in favour of one divergence over another,
or one aggregation method over another, or whether we should fix by minimizing distance
to or from coherence.
8.1 Aggregating as minimizing weighted average distance
Why think that we should aggregate the credence functions of a group of agents by finding
the single credence function from or to which the weighted average distance is minimal?
There is a natural argument that appeals to a principle that is used elsewhere in Bayesian
epistemology. Indeed, we have used it already in this paper in our brief justification for
fixing incoherent crecences by minimizing distance from or to coherence. It is the principle of
minimal mutilation. The idea is this: when you are given a collection of credences that you
know are flawed in some way, and from which you wish to extract a collection that is not
flawed, you should pick the unflawed collection that involves the least possible change to
the original flawed credences.
The principle of minimal mutilation is often used in arguments for credal updating rules.
Suppose you have a prior credence function, and then you acquire new evidence. Since it
is new evidence, your prior likely does not satisfy the constraints that your new evidence
places on your credences. How are you to respond? Your prior is now seen to be flawed— it
violates a constraint imposed by your evidence — so you wish to find credences that are not
flawed in this way. A natural thought is this: you should move to the credence function that
does satisfy those constraints and that involves the least possible change in your prior cre-
dences; in our terminology, you should move to the credence function whose distance from
or to your prior amongst those that satisfies the constraints is minimal. This is the principle
of minimal mutilation in action. And its application has lead to a number of arguments for
various updating rules, such as Conditionalization, Jeffrey Conditionalization, and others
(Williams, 1980; Lewis, 59; Diaconis & Zabell, 1982; Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010b; Levinstein,
2012b).
As we have seen in section 2, the principle of minimal mutilation is also our motiva-
tion for fixing an incoherent credence function c by taking FixD1(c) or FixD2(c), for some
divergenceD. And the same holds when you have a group of agents, each possibly incoher-
ent, and some of whom disagree with each other. Here, again, the credences you receive are
flawed in some way: within an individual agent’s credence functions, the credences may not
cohere with each other; and between agents, there will be conflicting credence assignments
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to the same proposition. We thus wish to find a set of credences that are not flawed in either
of these ways. We want one credence per proposition, and we want all of the credences to
cohere with one another. We do this by finding the set of such credences that involves as little
change as possible from the original set. The weightings in the weighted average of the di-
vergences allow us to choose which agent’s credences we’d least like to change (they receive
highest weighting) and whose we are happiest to change (they receive lowest weighting).
8.2 The No Dilemmas argument
As we noted above, in order to use Theorem 10(i), say, to extract a reason for using SED
from a reason for aggregating by linear pooling, we must argue that the three possible ways
of producing a single coherent credence function from a collection of possibly incoherent
credence functions should cooperate. That is, we must claim that aggregate-then-fix, fix-
then-aggregate, and the weighted coherent approximation principle should all give the same
outputs when suppliedwith the same input. The natural justification for this is a no dilemmas
argument. The point is that, if the three methods don’t agree on their outputs when given
the same set of inputs, we are forced to pick one of those different outputs to use. And if
there is no principled reason to pick one or another, whichever we pick, we cannot justify
using it rather than one of the others. Thus, for instance, given any decision where the
different outputs recommend different courses of action, we cannot justify picking the action
recommended by one of the outputs over the action recommended by one of the others.
Similarly, given any piece of statistical reasoning in which using the different outputs as
prior probabilities results in different conclusions at the end, we cannot justify adopting the
conclusion mandated by one of the outputs over the conclusion mandated by one of the
others.
Does this no dilemmas argument work? Of course, you might object if you think that
there are principled reasons for preferring onemethod to another. That is, youmight answer
the no dilemmas argument by claiming that there is no dilemma in the first place, because
one of the options is superior to the others. For instance, you might claim that it is more
natural to fix first and then aggregate than to aggregate first and then fix. You might say
that we can only expect an aggregate to be epistemically valuable when the credences to
be aggregated are epistemically valuable; and you might go on to say that credences aren’t
epistemically valuable if they’re incoherent.11 But this claim is compatible with aggregating
first and then fixing. I can still say that aggregates are only as epistemically valuable as
the credence functions they aggregate, and I can still say that the more coherent a credence
function the more epistemically valuable it is, and yet also say that I should aggregate and
then fix. After all, while the aggregate won’t be very epistemically valuable when the agents
are incoherent, once I’ve fixed it and made it coherent it will be. And there’s no reason to
think it will be epistemically worse than if I first fixed the agents and then aggregated them.
So I think this particular line of argument fails.
Here’s another. There are many different reasons why an agent might fail to live up
to the ideal of full coherence: the computations required to maintain coherence might be
beyond their cognitive powers; or coherence might not serve a sufficiently useful practical
goal to justify devoting the agent’s limited cognitive resources to its pursuit; or an agent
with credences over a partition might only ever have considered each cell of that partition
11Thanks to XX for urging me to address this line of objection.
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on its own, separately, and never have considered the logical relations between them, and
this might have lead her inadvertently to assign incoherent credences to them. So it might be
that, while there is no reason to favour aggregating-then-fixing over fixing-then-aggregating
or the weighted coherent approximation principle in general, there is reason to favour one or
other of these methods once we identify the root cause of the agent’s incoherence.
For instance, you might think that, when her incoherence results from a lack of attention
to the logical relations between the propositions, it would be better to treat the individual
credences in the individual members of the partition separately for as long as possible, since
they were set separately by the agent. And this tells in favour of aggregating via LP or GP−
first, since the aggregate credence each sets in a given proposition is a function only of the
credences that the agents assign to that proposition. I don’t find this argument compelling.
After all, it is precisely the fact that the agent has considered these propositions separately
that has given rise to their flaw. Had they considered them together as members of one
partition, they may come closer to the ideal of coherence. So it seems strange to wish to
maintain that separation for as long as possible. It seems just as good to fix the flaw that
has resulted from keeping them separate so far, and then aggregate the results. However,
while I find the argument weak, it does show how we might look to the reasons behind
the incoherence in a group of agents, or perhaps the reasons behind their disagreements,
in order to break the dilemma and argue that the three methods for fixing and aggregating
need not agree.
8.3 Minimizing divergence from or to coherence
As we have seen in Propositions 3 and 5 and Theorems 10 and 13, it makes a substantial
difference whether you fix incoherent credence functions by minimizing distance from or
to coherence, and whether you aggregate credences by minimizing distance from or to the
agents’ credence functions when you aggregate them. Do we have reason to favour one of
these directions or the other?
Here is one argument, at least in the case of fixing incoherent credences. Recall Theorem
9 from above. Suppose c is an incoherent credence function. Then let c∗ be the coherent
credence function for which the divergence from c∗ to c is minimal, and let c† be the coherent
credence function for which the distance to c† from c is minimal. Then c∗ is guaranteed to be
more accurate than c, while c† is not. Now, this gives us a reason for fixing an incoherent
credence function by minimizing the distance from coherence rather than the distance to
coherence. It explains why we should use FixD1 rather than FixD2 to fix incoherent credence
functions. After all, when D is a Bregman divergence, FixD1(c) is guaranteed to be more
accurate than c, by Theorem 9, whereas FixD2(c) is not.
8.4 Linear pooling vs geometric pooling
In this section, we briefly survey some of the arguments for and against linear or geometric
pooling. For useful surveys of the virtues and vices of different aggregation methods, see
(Genest & Zidek, 1986; Dietrich & List, 2015; Russell et al., 2015).
In favour of aggregating by linear pooling (LP): First, if each of the agents is coherent,
then so is the aggregate. Having said that, given that, for many aggregation methods, The-
orem 11 gives us ways to fix incoherent credences that commute with those methods, this
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isn’t a practical desideratum. If we have an aggregationmethod, like GP−, that does not nec-
essarily take coherent credences to a coherent aggregate, we can simply apply the relevant
method for fixing incoherence — in this case, FixGKL.
Second, McConway (1981) andWagner (1982) show that, amongst the aggregation meth-
ods that always take coherent credence functions to coherent aggregates, linear pooling is the
only one that satisfies what Dietrich & List (2015) call eventwise independence and unanimity
preservation. Eventwise Independence demands that aggregation is done proposition-wise
using the same method for each proposition. That is, an aggregation methods T satisfies
strong label neutrality if there is a function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] such that T(c1, . . . , cn)(Xj) =
f (c1(Xj), . . . , cn(Xj)) for each cell Xj in our partition F . Unanimity Preservation demands
that, when all agents have the same credence function, their aggregate should be that cre-
dence function. That is, T(c, . . . , c) = c, for any coherent credence function c. It is worth
noting, however, that GP− also satisfies both of these constraints; but of course it doesn’t
always take coherent credences to coherent aggregates.
Third, in a previous paper, I showed that linear pooling is recommended by the accuracy-
first approach in epistemology, which we met in section 6 (Pettigrew, ta). Suppose, like
nearly all parties to the accuracy-first debate, you measure the accuracy of credences using
what is known as a strictly proper scoring rule; this is equivalent to measuring the accuracy
of a credence function at a world as the divergence from the omniscient credence function at
that world to the credence function, where the divergence in question is an additive Bregman
divergence. Suppose further that each of the credence functions you wish to aggregate is
coherent. Then, if you aggregate by anything other than linear pooling, there will be an
alternative aggregate credence function that each of the agents expects to be more accurate
than your aggregate. I argue that a credence function cannot count as the aggregate of a
set of credence functions if there is some alternative that each of those credence functions
expects to do better epistemically speaking.
Against linear pooling: First, Dalkey (1975) notes that it does not commute with condi-
tionalization.12 Thus, if you first conditionalize your agents on a piece of evidence and then
linear pool, this usually gives a different result from linear pooling first and then condition-
alizing (at least if you use the same weights before and after the evidence is accommodated).
That is, typically,
LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn)(−|E) 6= LP{α}(c1(−|E), . . . , cn(−|E))
Second, Laddaga (1977) and Lehrer & Wagner (1983) note that linear pooling does not
preserve relationships of probabilistic independence.13 Thus, usually, if A and B are prob-
abilistically independent relative to each ci, they will not be probabilistically independent
relative to the linear pool. That is, if ci(A|B) = ci(A) for each ci, then usually
LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn)(A|B) 6= LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn)(A).
Geometric pooling (GP) succeeds where linear pooling fails, and fails where linear pool-
ing succeeds. The accuracy-first argument tells against it; and it violates Eventwise Indepen-
dence. But it commutes with conditionalization. What’s more, while linear pooling typically
returns an incoherent aggregate when given incoherent agents, geometric pooling always re-
turns a coherent aggregate, whether the agents are coherent or incoherent. Of course, this is
12For responses to this objection to linear pooling, see (Madansky, 1964; McConway, 1981; Pettigrew, ta).
13For responses to this objection to linear pooling, see (Genest & Wagner, 1987; Wagner, 2010; Pettigrew, ta).
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because we build in that coherence by hand when we normalize the geometric averages of
the agents’ credences.
8.5 Squared Euclidean distance vs generalized Kullback-Leibler divergence
There are a number of different ways in which we might argue in favour of SED or GKL.
In favour of squared Euclidean distance (SED): First, there is an argument that I have
offered elsewhere that proceeds in two steps (Pettigrew, 2016, Chapter 4): (i) we should
measure how far one credence function lies from another using additive Bregman diver-
gences, because only by doing so can we capture two competing senses of accuracy — the
alethic and the calibrationist — in one measure; (ii) the distance from one credence function
to another should be the same as the distance to the first credence from the second, so that
our divergence should be symmetric. Since SED is the only symmetric Bregman divergence,
this gives an argument in its favour.
Second, D’Agostino & Sinigaglia (2010) argue for SED axiomatically. SED is the only way
of measuring how far one credence function lies from another that satisfies certain plausible
formal constraints. Csisza´r (1991, 2008) offers axiomatic characterizations of SED and GKL
that allow us to tell between on the basis of their formal features.
Third, some argue in favour of SED indirectly. They argue primarily in favour of the
so-called Brier score.14 This is a particular inaccuracy measure that is widely used in the
accuracy-first epistemology literature. It is a strictly proper scoring rule. And it is the inac-
curacy measure that you obtain by using SED and taking inaccuracy to be divergence from
omniscient credences. Thus, arguments for the Brier score can be extended to give argu-
ments for SED. How might we argue for the Brier score? First, Schervish (1989) showed
that agents with different practical ends and different opinions about what decisions they
are likely to face will value their credences for pragmatic purposes using different strictly
proper scoring rules. Thus, we might argue for the Brier score if we have particular practi-
cal ends and if we hold a certain view about the sorts of decisions we’ll be asked to make
(Levinstein, ta). Second, youmight argue for the Brier score because of the way that it scores
particular credences. It is more forgiving of extreme inaccuracy than is, for instance, the
logarithmic scoring rule associated with GKL (Joyce, 2009).
Fourth, as we will see in section 9, when we consider credence functions defined over
sets of propositions that don’t form partitions, a dilemma arises when we use GKL that does
not arise when we use SED. As I will argue there, this speaks in favour of SED.
Against SED: if we use it to say how we should update in response to a certain sort of
evidence, it gives updating rules that seemdefective (Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010b; Levinstein,
2012a). It does not justify either Bayesian Conditionalization or Jeffrey Conditionalization;
and the alternative rules that it offers have undesirable features.
This argument against SED is also the primary argument in favour of GKL. As I show
elsewhere, it is difficult to find a Bregman divergence other than GKL that warrants updating
by Conditionalization and Jeffrey Conditionalization (Pettigrew, 2016, Theorem 15.1.4).
14According to the Brier score, the inaccuracy of a credence function c at a world w is
B(c,w) =
m
∑
i=1
(vw(Xi)− c(Xi))2
where vw is the omniscient credence function at world w.
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9 Beyond partitions
So far, we have restricted attention to credence functions defined on partitions. In this sec-
tion, we lift that restriction. Suppose Carmen and Donal are two further expert epidemiolo-
gists. They have credences in a rather broader range of propositions than Amira and Benito
do. They consider the proposition, X1, that the next ‘flu pandemic will occur in 2019, but
also the proposition, X2, that it will occur in 2020, the proposition X3 that it will occur in
neither 2019 nor 2020, and the proposition, X1 ∨ X2, that it will occur in 2019 or 2020. Thus,
they have credences in X1, X2, X3, and X1 ∨ X2, where the first three propositions form a
partition but the whole set of four does not. Unlike Amira and Benito, Carmen and Donal
are coherent. Here are their credences:
X1 X2 X3 X1 ∨ X2
Carmen (c1) 20% 30% 50% 50%
Donal (c2) 60% 30% 10% 90%
Since they are coherent, the question of how to fix them does not arise. So we are interested
here only in how to aggregate them. If we opt to combine SED and linear pooling, there are
three methods:
(LP1) Apply the method of linear pooling to the most fine-grained partition, namely, X1,
X2, X3, to give the aggregate credences for those three propositions. Then take the
aggregate credence for X1 ∨X2 to be the sum of the aggregate credences for X1 and X2,
as demanded by the axioms of the probability calculus.
For instance, suppose α = 12 . Then
• c∗(X1) = 120.2+ 120.6 = 0.4
• c∗(X2) = 120.3+ 120.3 = 0.3
• c∗(X3) = 120.5+ 120.1 = 0.3
• c∗(X1 ∨ X2) = c∗(X1) + c∗(X2) = 0.4+ 0.3 = 0.7.
(LP2) Extend the method of linear pooling from partitions to more general sets of proposi-
tions in the natural way: the aggregate credence for a proposition is just the weighted
arithmetic average of the credences for that proposition.
Again, suppose α = 12 . Then
• c∗(X1) = 120.2+ 120.6 = 0.4
• c∗(X2) = 120.3+ 120.3 = 0.3
• c∗(X3) = 120.5+ 120.1 = 0.3
• c∗(X1 ∨ X2) = 120.5+ 120.9 = 0.7.
(LP3) Apply WCAPSED, so that the aggregate credence function is the coherent credence
function that minimizes the arithmetic average of the squared Euclidean distances to
the credence functions.
Again, suppose α = 12 . Then
argmin
c′∈PF
1
2
SED(c′, c1) +
1
2
SED(c′, c2) =
1
2
c1 +
1
2
c2.
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It is easy to see that these three methods agree. And they continue to agree for any number
of agents, any weightings, and any set of propositions. Does the same happen if we opt
to combine GKL and geometric pooling? Unfortunately not. Here are the analogous three
methods:
(GP1) Apply the method of geometric pooling to the most fine-grained partition, namely, X1,
X2, X3, to give the aggregate credences for those three propositions. Then take the
aggregate credence for X1 ∨X2 to be the sum of the aggregate credences for X1 and X2,
as demanded by the axioms of the probability calculus.
Suppose α = 12 . Then
• c∗(X1) =
√
0.2
√
0.6√
0.2
√
0.6+
√
0.3
√
0.3+
√
0.5
√
0.1
≈ 0.398
• c∗(X2) =
√
0.3
√
0.3√
0.2
√
0.6+
√
0.3
√
0.3+
√
0.5
√
0.1
≈ 0.345
• c∗(X3) =
√
0.5
√
0.1√
0.2
√
0.6+
√
0.3
√
0.3+
√
0.5
√
0.1
≈ 0.257
• c∗(X1 ∨ X2) = c∗(X1) + c∗(X2) ≈ 0.743
(GP2) Extend the method of geometric pooling from partitions to more general sets of cre-
dence functions.
The problemwith this method is that it isn’t clear how to effect this extension. After all,
when we geometrically pool credences over a partition, we start by taking weighted
geometric averages and then we normalize. We can, of course, still take weighted ge-
ometric averages when we extend beyond partitions. But it isn’t clear how we would
normalize. In the partition case, we take a cell of the partition, take the weighted ge-
ometric average of the credences in that cell, then divide through by the sum of the
weighted geometric averages of the credences in the various cells of the partition. But
suppose that we try this once we add X1 ∨ X2 to our partition X1, X2, X3. The problem
is that the normalized version of the weighted geometric average of the agents’ cre-
dences in X1 ∨ X2 is not the sum of the normalized versions of the weighted geometric
averages of the credences in X1 and in X2. But how else are we to normalize?
(GP3) Apply WCAPSED, so that the aggregate credence function is the coherent credence
function that minimizes the arithmetic average of the generalized Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence from that credence function to the credence functions.
Again, suppose α = 12 . Now, we can show that, if c
∗ = argmin
c′∈PF
1
2GKL(c
′, c1) +
1
2GKL(c
′, c2), then
• c∗(X1) = 0.390
• c∗(X2) = 0.338
• c∗(X3) = 0.272
• c∗(X1 ∨ X2) = 0.728
Thus, (GP2) does not work — we cannot formulate it. And (GP1) and (GP3) disagree. This
creates a dilemma for those who opt for the package containing GKL and geometric pooling.
How should they aggregate credences when the agents have credences in propositions that
don’t form a partition? Do they choose (GP1) or (GP3)? To avoid the dilemma, I claim, we
should opt for SED and linear pooling instead.
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10 Conclusion
This completes our investigation into the methods by which we might produce a single co-
herent credence function from a group of possibly incoherent expert credence functions. At
the heart of our investigation is a set of results that suggest that squared Euclidean distance
pairs naturally with linear pooling, while the generalized Kullback-Leibler divergence pairs
naturally with geometric pooling. I suggested that these results might be used by philoso-
phers to argue for an aggregation method if they have reason to favour a particular diver-
gence, or to argue for a particular divergence if they have reason to favour one aggregation
method over another.
11 Appendix: Proofs
11.1 Two useful lemmas
We begin by stating two useful lemmas to which we will appeal in our proofs. Throughout,
we suppose:
• D is the additive Bregman divergence generated by ϕ;
• α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0 and ∑nk=1 αk = 1;
• c, c′ are credence functions defined on the partition F = {X1, . . . ,Xm};
• CF = {c : {X1, . . . ,Xm} → [0, 1]}
• PF = {c : {X1, . . . ,Xm} → [0, 1] | ∑mi=1 c(Xi) = 1}.
Lemma 15 Suppose {α} = {α1, . . . , αk} is a set of weights for the experts.
(i) c∗ = argmin
c′∈CF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(c
′, ck) iff
ϕ′(c∗(Xj)) =
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj))
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
(ii) c∗ = argmin
c′∈PF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(c
′, ck) iff c∗ is coherent and there is a constant K such that
ϕ′(c∗(Xj))−
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj)) = K
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Proof of Lemma 15.
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(i) Consider the function
n
∑
k=1
αkD ((x1, . . . , xm), (ck(X1), . . . , ck(Xm)))
=
n
∑
k=1
αk
(
m
∑
i=1
(
ϕ(xi)− ϕ(ck(Xi))− ϕ′(ck(Xi))(xi − ck(Xi))
))
=
m
∑
i=1
n
∑
k=1
αk
(
ϕ(xi)− ϕ(ck(Xi))− ϕ′(ck(Xi))(xi − ck(Xi))
)
Then, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
∂
∂xj
n
∑
k=1
αkD ((x1, . . . , xm), (ck(X1), . . . , ck(Xm)))
=
n
∑
k=1
αk
(
ϕ′(xj)− ϕ′(ck(Xj))
)
= ϕ′(xj)−
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xi))
as required.
(ii) Consider the function
n
∑
k=1
αkD
(
(x1, . . . , xm−1, 1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl), (ck(X1), . . . , ck(Xm))
)
=
n
∑
k=1
αk
(
m−1
∑
i=1
(
ϕ(xi)− ϕ(ck(Xi))− ϕ′(ck(Xi))(xi − ck(Xi))
)
+
(
ϕ(1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl)− ϕ(ck(Xm))− ϕ′(ck(Xm))(1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl − ck(Xm))
))
Then, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1,
∂
∂xj
n
∑
k=1
αkD
(
(x1, . . . , xm−1, 1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl), (ck(X1), . . . , ck(Xm))
)
=
n
∑
k=1
αk
(
ϕ′(xj)− ϕ′(ck(Xj))
)− n∑
k=1
αk
(
ϕ′(1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl)− ϕ′(ck(Xm))
)
as required.
Lemma 16 Suppose {α} is a set of weights for the experts. Then
(i) c∗ = argmin
c′∈CF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(ck, c
′) iff
(
c∗(Xj)−
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
)
ϕ′′(c∗(Xj)) = 0
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
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(ii) c∗ = argmin
c′∈PF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(ck, c
′) iff c∗ is coherent and there is a constant K such that
(
c∗(Xj)−
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
)
ϕ′′(c∗(Xj)) = K
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Proof of Lemma 16.
(i) Consider the function
n
∑
k=1
αkD ((ck(X1), . . . , ck(Xm)), (x1, . . . , xm))
=
n
∑
k=1
αk
(
m
∑
i=1
ϕ(ck(Xi))− ϕ(xi)− ϕ′(xi)(ck(Xi)− xi)
)
Then, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
∂
∂xj
n
∑
k=1
αkD ((ck(X1), . . . , ck(Xm)), (x1, . . . , xm))
=
(
xj −
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
)
ϕ′′(xj)
as required.
(ii) Consider the function
n
∑
k=1
αkD
(
(ck(X1), . . . , ck(Xm)), (x1, . . . , xm−1, 1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl)
)
=
n
∑
k=1
αk
(
m−1
∑
i=1
ϕ(ck(Xi))− ϕ(xi)− ϕ′(xi)(ck(Xi)− xi)+
ϕ(ck(Xm))− ϕ(1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl)− ϕ′(1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl)(ck(Xm)− 1+
m−1
∑
l=1
xl)
)
Then, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
∂
∂xj
n
∑
k=1
αkD
(
(ck(X1), . . . , ck(Xm)), (x1, . . . , xm−1, 1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl)
)
=
(
xj −
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
)
ϕ′′(xj)−
(
1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl −
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xm)
)
ϕ′′(1−
m−1
∑
l=1
xl)
as required.
This completes the proof. ✷
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Corollary 17 Suppose D is the additive Bregman divergence generated by ϕ. Then
(i) c∗ = argmin
c′∈PF
D(c′, c) iff c∗ is coherent and there is a constant K such that
ϕ′(c∗(Xj))− ϕ′(c(Xj)) = K
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
(ii) c∗ = argmin
c′∈PF
D(c, c′) iff c∗ is coherent and there is a constant K such that
(c∗(Xj)− c(Xj))ϕ′′(c∗(Xj)) = K
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Proof of Corollary 17. These follow immediately from Lemmas 15(ii) and 16(ii), respectively,
when n = 1. ✷
11.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1(i) SED is the additive Bregman divergence generated by ϕ(x) = x2.
Thus, ϕ′(x) = 2x. What’s more, SED is symmetric; so FixSED1(c) = FixSED2(c). Thus, by
Corollary 17(i), c∗ = FixSED1(c) = FixSED2(c) = argmin
c′∈PF
SED(c′, c) iff c∗ is coherent and there
is K such that 2(c∗(Xj)− c(Xj)) = K (for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) iff c∗(Xj) = c(Xj) + 1−∑
m
i=1 c(Xi)
m (for
all 1 ≤ j ≤ m). ✷
Proof of Proposition 1(ii) GKL is the additive Bregman divergence generated by ϕ(x) =
x log x− x. Thus, ϕ′(x) = log x. Thus, by Corollary 17(i), c∗ = FixGKL1(c) = argmin
c′∈PF
GKL(c′, c)
iff c∗ is coherent and there is K such that log c∗(Xj)− log c(Xj) = K (for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) iff c∗ is
coherent and there is K such that c∗(Xj) = K · c(Xj) (for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) iff c∗(Xj) = c(Xj)∑mi=1 c(Xi)
(for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m). ✷
Also, by Corollary 17(ii), c∗ = FixGKL2(c) = argmin
c′∈PF
GKL(c, c′) iff c∗ is coherent and there
is K such that
c∗(Xj)−c(Xj)
c∗(Xj)
= K (for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) iff c∗ is coherent and there is K such that
c(Xj)
c∗(Xj)
= K (for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) iff c∗ is coherent and there is K such that c∗(Xj) = K · c(Xj) (for
all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) iff c∗(Xj) = c(Xj)∑mi=1 c(Xi) (for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m). ✷
11.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2(i) By Proposition 1(i),
FixSED(ck)(Xj) = c(Xj) +
1−∑mi=1 ck(Xi)
m
27
So
LP{α}(FixSED(c1), . . . , FixSED(cn))(Xj)
=
n
∑
k=1
αkFixSED(ck)(Xj)
=
n
∑
k=1
αk
(
ck(Xj) +
1−∑mi=1 ck(Xi)
m
)
=
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj) +
1−∑mi=1 ∑nk=1 αkck(Xi)
m
By Proposition 1(i),
FixSED(LP
{α}(c1, . . . , cn))
= FixSED(
n
∑
k=1
αkck)(Xj)
=
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj) +
1−∑mi=1 ∑nk=1 αkck(Xi)
m
Thus,
LP{α}(FixSED(c1), . . . , FixSED(cn))(Xj) = FixSED(LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn))(Xj)
as required. ✷
Proof of Proposition 2(iii) By Proposition 1(ii),
FixGKL(ck)(Xj) =
ck(Xj)
∑
m
i=1 ck(Xi)
So,
GP{α}(FixGKL(c1), . . . , FixGKL(cn))(Xj)
=
∏
n
k=1 FixGKL(ck)(Xj)
αk
∑
m
i=1 ∏
n
k=1 FixGKL(ck)(Xi)
αk
=
∏
n
k=1
(
ck(Xj)
∑
m
i=1 ck(Xi)
)αk
∑
m
l=1 ∏
n
k=1
(
ck(Xl)
∑
m
i=1 ck(Xi)
)αk
=
∏
n
k=1 ck(Xj)
αk
∑
m
l=1 ∏
n
k=1 ck(Xl)
αk
Now, recall that, since geometric pooling always results in a coherent credence function,
FixGKL(GP
{α}(c1, . . . , cn)) = GP{α}(c1, . . . , cn)
And
GP{α}(c1, . . . , cn))(Xj) =
∏
n
k=1 ck(Xj)
αk
∑
m
l=1 ∏
n
k=1 ck(Xl)
αk
So
FixGKL(GP
{α}(c1, . . . , cn))(Xj) = GP{α}(FixGKL(c1), . . . , FixGKL(cn))(Xj)
as required. ✷
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11.4 Proof of Proposition 3
This follows from Theorem 12, which we prove below.
11.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof of Propositions 5(i) and (ii) These are immediate consequences of Propositions 2 and 3
and Theorem 10. ✷
Proof of Proposition 5(iii) By Lemma 16(ii), c∗ = WCAP{α}GKL2(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈PF
∑
n
k=1 αkGKL(ck, c
′)
iff c∗ is coherent and there is K such that
c∗(Xj)−∑nk=1 αkck(Xj)
c∗(Xj)
= K
(for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) iff c∗ is coherent and there is K such that
∑
n
k=1 αkck(Xj)
c∗(Xj)
= K
(for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) iff c∗ is coherent and there is K such that c∗(Xj) = K ·∑nk=1 αkck(Xj) (for
all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) iff
c∗(Xj) =
∑
n
k=1 αkck(Xj)
∑
m
i=1 ∑
n
k=1 αkck(Xi)
(for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m) as required. ✷
Proof of Proposition 5(iv)
Agg
{α}
GKL2
(c1, . . . , cn)(Xj) =
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
and
FixGKL2(c)(Xj) =
c(Xj)
∑
m
i=1 c(Xi)
So
FixGKL2(Agg
{α}
GKL2
(c1, . . . , cn))(Xj) =
∑
n
k=1 αkck(Xj)
∑
m
i=1 ∑
n
k=1 αkck(Xi)
= WCAP
{α}
GKL2
(c1, . . . , cn)(Xj)
as required. ✷
11.6 Proof of Propositions 6 and 7
Recall:
WGCAP
{α}
D1
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈PF
n
∏
k=1
D(c′, ck)αk
First, suppose c′ 6= ck, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Then, by the definition of a divergence, for all 1 ≤
k ≤ n, D(c′, ck) > 0. Thus, ∏nk=1D(c′, ck)αk > 0. Next, suppose c′ = ck for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Then, again by the definition of a divergence,D(c′, ck) = 0. Thus, ∏nk=1D(c′, ck)αk = 0. Thus,
∏
n
k=1D(c
′, ck)αk is minimized iff c′ = ck for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n. And similarly for WGCAP{α}D2 ,
GAgg
D1
, and GAgg
D2
. ✷
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11.7 Proof of Theorem 10
Proof of Theorem 10(i) Suppose FixD1 ◦ LP = WCAPD1 . Given 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, let
(x∗, 1− x∗) be the coherent credence function that results from applying both procedures to
the credence functions (a, 0) (which assigns a to X and 0 to X) and (b, 0) (which assigns b to
X and 0 to X) — it assigns x∗ to X and 1− x∗ to X. That is,
(x∗, 1− x∗) = FixD1(LPα((a, 0), (b, 0)) = WCAPαD1((a, 0), (b, 0))
By Corollary 17(i),
ϕ′(x∗)− ϕ′(1− x∗) = ϕ′(αa+ (1− α)b)− ϕ′(α · 0+ (1− α) · 0)
And by Lemma 15(ii),
ϕ′(x∗)− ϕ′(1− x∗) = (αϕ′(a) + (1− α)ϕ′(b))− (αϕ′(0) + (1− α)ϕ′(0))
So
ϕ′(αa+(1− α)b)− ϕ′(α · 0+(1− α) · 0) = (αϕ′(a)+ (1− α)ϕ′(b))− (αϕ′(0)+ (1− α)ϕ′(0))
So
ϕ′(αa+ (1− α)b) = αϕ′(a) + (1− α)ϕ′(b)
Thus, ϕ′(x) = kx+ c for some constants k, c. And so ϕ(x) = mx2+ kx+ c, for some constants
m, k, c. Since ϕ is strictly convex, m > 0. Now, it turns out that, if ψ is a strictly convex
function and θ(x) = ψ(x) + kx + c, then ϕ and ψ generate the same Bregman divergence.
After all,
θ(x)− θ(y)− θ′(y)(x− y) = (ψ(x) + kx+ c)− (ψ(y) + ky+ c)− (ψ′(x) + k)(x− y)
= ψ(x)− ψ(y)− ψ′(y)(x− y)
SoD is a positive linear transformation of SED, as required. ✷
Proof of Theorem 10(ii) Suppose FixD1 ◦GP = GP ◦ FixD1 = WCAPD1 . First, apply FixD1 ◦GP
to a single credence function (a, b), which assigns a to X and b to X. Since geometric pooling
also fixes, FixD1 ◦GP = GP, so they both take (a, b) and return
(
a
a+b ,
b
a+b
)
. Since FixD1 ◦GP =
GP ◦ FixD1 , this is also the result of applying GP ◦ FixD1 to (a, b). Thus, by Corollary 17(i), we
have
ϕ′
(
a
a+ b
)
− ϕ′
(
b
a+ b
)
= ϕ′(a)− ϕ′(b) (1)
for all 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1. We will use this identity below.
Next, since FixD1 ◦GP = WCAPD1 , and since FixD1 ◦GP is just geometric pooling, and since
geometric pooling takes two credence functions (a, b) and (a′, b′) and returns
(
aαa′1−α
aαa′1−α + bαb′1−α
,
bαb′1−α
aαa′1−α + bαb′1−α
)
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then WCAPD1 must return that too when given (a, b) and (a
′, b′). Thus, by Lemma 15(ii),
ϕ′
(
aαa′1−α
aαa′1−α + bαb′1−α
)
− ϕ′
(
bαb′1−α
aαa′1−α + bαb′1−α
)
= (αϕ′(a) + (1− α)ϕ′(a′))− (αϕ′(b) + (1− α)ϕ′(b′))
Now, by the identity (1) proved above, we have
ϕ′
(
aαa′1−α
aαa′1−α + bαb′1−α
)
− ϕ′
(
bαb′1−α
aαa′1−α + bαb′1−α
)
= ϕ′(aαa′1−α)− ϕ′(bαb′1−α)
So
ϕ′(aαa′1−α)− ϕ′(bαb′1−α) = (αϕ′(a) + (1− α)ϕ′(a′))− (αϕ′(b) + (1− α)ϕ′(b′)) (2)
for all 0 ≤ a, b, a′ , b′ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. So let b = a′ = b′ = 1. Then
ϕ′(aα)− ϕ′(1) = (αϕ′(a) + (1− α)ϕ′(1))− (αϕ′(1) + (1− α)ϕ′(1))
So
ϕ′(aα) = αϕ′(a) + (1− α)ϕ′(1) (3)
for all 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Now, take any 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1. Then there are 0 ≤ c, d ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 such that a = cα and b = d1−α (in fact, you can always take α = 12 ). Then, by
identity (2) from above,
ϕ′(ab)− ϕ′(1) = ϕ′(cαd1−α)− ϕ′(1) = αϕ′(c) + (1− α)ϕ′(d)− ϕ(1)
But by identity (3) from above,
• αϕ′(c) = ϕ′(cα)− (1− α)ϕ′(1) = ϕ′(a)− (1− α)ϕ′(1)
• (1− α)ϕ′(d) = ϕ′(d1−α)− αϕ′(1) = ϕ′(b)− αϕ′(1)
So
ϕ′(ab) = ϕ′(a)− (1− α)ϕ′(1) + ϕ′(b)− αϕ′(1)
iff
ϕ′(ab) = ϕ′(a) + ϕ′(b)− ϕ′(1)
for all 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1. And this is the Cauchy functional equation for the logarithmic function.
So ϕ′(x) = m log x+ k, for some constants m, k. Hence, ϕ(x) = m(x log x− x) + kx + c, for
some constant c. As we noted above, if ψ is a strictly convex function and θ(x) = ψ(x) +
kx+ c, then θ generates the same Bregman divergence as ψ. And thus,D is a positive linear
transformation of GKL, as required. ✷
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11.8 Proof of Theorem 11
Proof of Theorem 11. By Lemma 15(i), c∗ = Agg{α}
D1
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈CF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(c
′, ck) iff,
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
ϕ′(c∗(Xj)) =
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj)).
Then, by Corollary 17(i), c† = FixD1(Agg
{α}
D1
(c1, . . . , cn)) = FixD1(c
∗) = argmin
c′∈PF
D(c′, c∗) iff
c† is coherent and there is a constant K such that, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
ϕ′(c†(Xj))− ϕ′(c∗(Xj)) = K
iff c† is coherent and there is a constant K such that, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
ϕ′(c†(Xj))−
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj)) = K
iff c† = WCAP
{α}
D
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈PF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(c
′, ck), by Lemma 15(ii).
Furthermore, c†k = FixD1(ck) = argmin
c′∈PF
D(c′, ck) iff c† is coherent and there is a constant K
such that, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
ϕ′(c†k(Xj))− ϕ′(ck(Xj)) = K
And c∗ = Agg{α}
D1
(c†1, . . . , c
†
n) = argmin
c′∈CF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(c
′, c†k) iff, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
ϕ′(c∗(Xj)) =
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(c†k(Xj))
Now,
ϕ′(c∗(Xj))−
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj))
=
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(c†k(Xj))−
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj))
=
n
∑
k=1
αk
(
ϕ′(c†k(Xj))− ϕ′(ck(Xj))
)
= K
Thus, c∗ = Agg{α}
D1
(FixD1(c1), . . . , FixD1(cn)) iff c
∗ is coherent and there is a constant K such
that, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
ϕ′(c∗(Xj))−
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj)) = K
iff c∗ = WCAP{α}
D1
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈PF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(c
′, ck), by Lemma 15(ii). ✷
32
11.9 Proof of Theorem 13
Proof of Theorem 13(i) By Lemma 16(ii), c∗ = WCAP{α}
D2
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈PF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(ck, c
′)
iff c∗ is coherent and there is a constant K such that
(c∗(Xj)−
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj))ϕ
′′(c∗(Xj)) = K
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. By Corollary 17(ii), c∗ = FixD2(LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn)) = FixD2(∑nk=1 αkck) =
argmin
c′∈PF
D(∑nk=1 αkck, c
′) iff c∗ is coherent and there is a constant K such that
(c∗(Xj)−
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj))ϕ
′′(c∗(Xj)) = K
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Thus, FixD2 ◦ LP = WCAPD2 , as required. ✷
Proof of Theorem 13(ii) If c1, . . . , cn are coherent, then
FixD2(LP
{α}(c1, . . . , cn)) = LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn) = LP{α}(FixD2(c1), . . . , FixD2(cn))
as required. ✷
Proof of Theorem 13(iii) Suppose c1, c2 are defined on the partition X1, X2, X3. By Lemma
15(i), c∗α = WCAP
{α}
D2
(c1, c2) = argmin
c′∈PF
αD(c1, c
′) + (1− α)D(c2, c′) iff c∗α is coherent and
(c∗α(Xi)− (αc1(Xi) + (1− α)c2(Xi)))ϕ′′(c∗α(Xi))
= (c∗α(Xj)− (αc1(Xj) + (1− α)c2(Xj)))ϕ′′(c∗α(Xj))
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. By Corollary 17(ii), c∗k = FixD2(ck) = argmin
c′∈PF
D(ck, c
′) iff c∗k is coherent
and
(c∗k (Xi)− ck(Xi))ϕ′′(c∗k (Xi)) = (c∗k (Xj)− ck(Xj))ϕ′′(c∗k (Xj))
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. Since WCAP{α}
D2
= LP ◦ FixD2 ,
((αc∗1(Xi) + (1− α)c∗2(Xi))− (αc1(Xi) + (1− α)c2(Xi)))ϕ′′(αc∗1(Xi) + (1− α)c∗2(Xi))
= ((αc∗1(Xj) + (1− α)c∗2(Xj))− (αc1(Xj) + (1− α)c2(Xj)))ϕ′′(αc∗1(Xj) + (1− α)c∗2(Xj))
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, and this holds iff
(α(c∗1(Xi)− c1(Xi)) + (1− α)(c∗2(Xi)− c2(Xi)))ϕ′′(αc∗1(Xi) + (1− α)c∗2(Xi))
= (α(c∗1(Xj)− c1(Xj)) + (1− α)(c∗2(Xj)− c2(Xj)))ϕ′′(αc∗1(Xj) + (1− α)c∗2(Xj))
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. Now, for all coherent credence functions c, c∗ = c. So, if α > 0, then
(c∗1(X1)− c1(X1))ϕ′′(αc∗1(X1) + (1− α)c(X1))
= (c∗1(X2)− c1(X2))ϕ′′(αc∗1(X2) + (1− α)c(X2))
Now, given any 0 < x, y < 1, we can find 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1 such that
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• αc∗1(X1) + (1− α)a = x
• αc∗1(X1) + (1− α)b = y.
Then let c, c′ be the following coherent credence functions:
• c(X1) = a, c(X2) = 0, c(X3) = 1− a
• c′(X1) = b, c′(X2) = 0, c′(X3) = 1− b.
Then
(c∗1(X1)− c1(X1))ϕ′′(x)
= (c∗1(X1)− c1(X1))ϕ′′(αc∗1(X1) + (1− α)a)
= (c∗1(X1)− c1(X1))ϕ′′(αc∗1(X1) + (1− α)c(X1))
= (c∗1(X2)− c1(X2))ϕ′′(αc∗1(X2) + (1− α)c(X2))
= (c∗1(X2)− c1(X2))ϕ′′(αc∗1(X2) + (1− α) · 0)
= (c∗1(X2)− c1(X2))ϕ′′(αc∗1(X2) + (1− α)c′(X2))
= (c∗1(X1)− c1(X1))ϕ′′(αc∗1(X1) + (1− α)c′(X1))
= (c∗1(X1)− c1(X1))ϕ′′(αc∗1(X1) + (1− α)b)
= (c∗1(X1)− c1(X1))ϕ′′(y)
Thus, ϕ′′(x) = ϕ′′(y), for all 0 < x, y < 1. Thus, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, ϕ′′(x) = m, so ϕ′(x) =
mx + k, so ϕ(x) = m′x2 + kx + c, for some constants m,m′, k, c. Thus D is a positive linear
transformation of SED, as required. ✷
11.10 Proof of Theorems 12 and 14
Proof of Theorem 12(i) By Lemma 15(i), c∗ = Agg{α}
D1
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈CF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(c
′, ck)
iff, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
ϕ′(c∗(Xj)) =
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj))
And of course c∗ = LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn) iff, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
c∗(Xj) =
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
Thus, Agg
D1
= LP iff, for any α1, . . . , αn, and c1, . . . , cn,
ϕ′
(
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
)
=
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj))
iff, for any 0 ≤ x, y,≤ 1, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
ϕ′(αx+ (1− α)y) = αϕ′(x) + (1− α)ϕ′(y)
And thus, ϕ′(x) = kx+ c, for some constants k, c. From this point, the proof proceeds in the
same fashion as the proof of Theorem 10(i). ✷
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Proof of Theorem 12(ii) Again, by Lemma 15(i), c∗ = Agg{α}
D1
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈CF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(c
′, ck)
iff, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
ϕ′(c∗(Xj)) =
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj))
And of course c∗ = GP{α}− (c1, . . . , cn) iff, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
c∗(Xj) =
n
∏
k=1
ck(Xj)
αk
Thus, Agg
D1
= GP− iff, for any α1, . . . , αn, and c1, . . . , cn,
ϕ′
(
n
∏
k=1
ck(Xj)
αk
)
=
n
∑
k=1
αkϕ
′(ck(Xj))
iff, for any 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
ϕ′(xαy1−α) = αϕ′(x) + (1− α)ϕ′(y)
And thus, ϕ′(x) = m log x+ k, for some constants m, k. From this point on, the proof pro-
ceeds in the same fashion as the proof of Theorem 10(ii). ✷
Proof of Theorem 14(i) By Lemma 16(i), c∗ = Agg{α}
D2
(c1, . . . , cn) = argmin
c′∈CF
∑
n
k=1 αkD(ck, c
′)
iff, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, (
c∗(Xj)−
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
)
ϕ′′(c∗(Xj)) = 0
And of course c∗ = LP{α}(c1, . . . , cn) iff, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
c∗(Xj) =
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
Thus, Agg
D2
= LP iff
(
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)−
n
∑
k=1
αkck(Xj)
)
ϕ′′(c∗(Xj)) = 0
And that is true for any D. ✷
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